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By John C. Burke*
Witness Rules Change,
Codify Nebraska Law
Like a piece of ice on a hot stove, the poem




It is appropriate to examine the meltings of the Proposed Ne-
braska Rules of Evidence (hereinafter "Nebraska Rule[s]," "Ne-
braska proposal" or "Rule[s]") for each proposed rule, not unlike
the poem described by Frost, "must ride on its own melting."
Every experienced producer knows that a change of pace is es-
sential to the success of any worthwhile production and I suspect
that the law review editors had this principle in mind when they
invited a trial judge, in sharp contrast to the contributing Thayer-
Wigmore-Morgan scholars, to comment on the practical effect in
the courtroom of the Nebraska proposal covering witnesses.
Rule 601
GENERAL RULE OF COMPETENCY
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided in these rules.
Under this Rule, all witnesses are competent, unless otherwise
specified in the Rules. (See, for example, Article V). No mental
or moral qualifications are specified.'
The Rule's practical effect is to remove the question of the wit-
ness' competency from the trial judge, permit the witness to testify
without undergoing a voir dire examination and allow the witness'
weight and credibility to be tested on cross-examination.
* Judge of the Fourth Judicial District; Chairman, Nebraska Supreme
Court Committee on Practice and Procedure.
1. Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1201 (Reissue 1964).
WITNESSES
The trial judge would retain limited control of the witness un-
der Rules 403 and 602. The judge also would rule on the suffi-
ciency of the evidence.
The Rule's most controversial aspect concerns elimination of the
so-called dead man's statute governing the competency of witnesses
in actions involving a deceased person's representative.2 The de-
bate continues, but many have observed that while invoking privi-
lege statutes and dead man statutes sometimes results in justice,
more often the statutes impede the truth.
Rule 602
LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is intro-
duced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowl-
edge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may,
but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness himself. This
rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion
testimony by expert witnesses.
This Rule states the usual requirement that a lay witness must
have firsthand knowledge of the matter about which he is to tes-
tify.3 The trial judge makes the finding as to whether or not the
foundation requirements have been met. For example, if the wit-
ness is unintelligible because of infancy or senility and the founda-
tion requirements of firsthand knowledge cannot otherwise be sup-
plied, the judge would not allow further testimony by the witness.
The first hand knowledge requirement carries over to Rules 803
and 804 covering exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Rule 603
OATH OR AFFIRMATION
Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare
that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered
in a form calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his
mind with his duty to do so.
This Rule allows the judge to select the form of oath or affirma-
tion to be administered and, if he so desires, to depart from the
ritual recitation required by the present statute.4
2. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1202 (Cun. Supp. 1972).
3. Peake v. Omaha Cold Storage Co., 15 Neb. 676, 64 N.W.2d 470 (1954).
4. NEs. REv. STAT. §§ 25-1237, 25-2220 (Reissue 1964); NEB. CONST. art. I,
§ 4.
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Rule 604
INTERPRETERS
An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these rules relat-
ing to qualification as an expert and the administration of an oath
or affirmation that he will make a true translation.
Under this Rule, the interpreter would be appointed by the
judge and would be subject to Rule 702. This is consistent with
Nebraska law covering persons who because of hearing or speak-
ing impairments are unable to communicate the English language.5
Rule 605
COMPETENCY OF JUDGE AS WITNESS
The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial
as a witness. No objection need be made in order to preserve the
point.
This Rule would advance the existing law in Nebraska. Under
existing Nebraska law, the judge is a competent witness for either
party and in his "discretion" may disqualify himself.6 The Rule
properly restricts the judge; counsel need not object to preserve
the error on appeal.
Rule 606
COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS
(a) At the Trial. A member of the jury may not testify as
a witness before that jury in the trial of the case in which he
is sitting as a juror. If he is called so to testify, the opposing
party shall be afforded an opportunity to object out of the pres-
ence of the jury.
(b) Inquiry Into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an
inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may
not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the
course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon
his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to
assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning
his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror
may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial infor-
mation was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether
any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon anyjuror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him
indicating an effect of this kind be received for these purposes.
5. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-2401 to -2406 (Supp. 1973); Prokop v. State,
148 Neb. 582, 28 N.W.2d 200 (1947).
6. NEB. Ray. STAT. § 25-1205 (Reissue 1964).
WITNESSES
(a) At the Trial. This subdivision would advance Nebraska's
existing law. A juror, as a judge of the facts, would be disquali-
fied from testifying before the jury in the trial of the case in which
he is sitting as a juror. This is consistent with Rule 605.
Under existing Nebraska law, a juror is a qualified witness to
testify in a case in which he is sitting as a juror, at least where
no objection has been made.7
(b) Inquiry Into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. This sub-
division would change existing Nebraska law.8 If this Rule were
passed, in proceedings to impeach a verdict, a juror could not tes-
tify about matters or statements occurring during the jury's de-
liberations. A juror also could not testify about his emotions or
mental processes in reaching the decision, but he could testify on
whether extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.
The Rule's purpose is to protect freedom of deliberation, ensure
stability of verdicts and protect jurors from harassment. In short,
private deliberations should not be made the subject of public in-
vestigation.9 It would appear that the jury's conduct, for example,
in reaching a quotient verdict would not be a proper subject of
inquiry into the verdict's validity. On the other hand, any extran-
eous prejudicial information, such as a prejudicial newspaper ar-
ticle, or outside influence, such as a bailiff's improper conduct, af-
fecting the jury's deliberations would be a proper subject of in-
quiry. Whether a flask smuggled into the jury room by a juror




The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, in-
cluding the party calling him.
This Rule is consistent with Nebraska law.10 The fact that a
party calls a particular person as a witness does not mean that
such party necessarily holds out such witness as worthy of belief
in everything he says.
7. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1201 (Reissue 1964); Richards v. State, 36
Neb. 17, 53 N.W. 1027 (1893); Wood River Bank v. Dodge, 36 Neb.
708, 55 N.W. 234 (1893).
8. Haarberg v. Schneider, 174 Neb. 334, 117 N.W.2d 796 (1962).
9. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
10. State v. Fronning, 186 Neb. 463, 183 N.W.2d 920 (1971).
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Rule 608
EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF WITNESS
(a) Opinion and Reputation Evidence of Character. The cred-
ibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence
in the form of reputation or opinion, but subject to these limita-
tions: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthful-
ness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is
admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness
has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of the
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting
his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule
609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, how-
ever, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness and not remote
in time, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness him-
self or on cross-examination of a witness who testifies to his char-
acter for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any
other witness, does not operate as a waiver of his privilege against
self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which
relate only to credibility.
(a) Opinion and Reputation Evidence of Character. This Rule
would change existing Nebraska law.1 ' Under this Rule, a witness
could give his personal "opinion" as to the truthfulness or untruth-
fulness and reputation of another witness. Heretofore, questions
were couched in terms of "reputation in the community," but an-
swers were most likely based upon personal opinon.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. The first sentence of the
Rule is consistent with existing Nebraska law.' 2  The remainder
of the Rule covers the cross-examination of the witness to test
credibility. With respect to specific instances of conduct, the Ne-
braska rule heretofore has required that questions propounded to
a character witness on cross-examination be in the form "have you
heard?" rather than "do you know?" to be consistent with the
hearsay testimony concerning reputation on direct examination.'3
Now that the witness can give his personal opinion of the other
witness' truthfulness or untruthfulness, the testifying witness may
be asked on cross-examination if he doesn't "know" of specific in-
stances of conduct. If the witness answers in the negative, the
cross-examiner is, of course, bound by the answer.
11. Lee v. State, 147 Neb. 333, 23 N.W.2d 316 (1946); Faulkner v. Gilbert,
61 Neb. 602, 85 N.W. 843 (1901).
12. Boche v. State, 84 Neb. 845, 122 N.W. 72 (1909); Myers v. State, 51
Neb. 517, 71 N.W. 33 (1897).
13. State v. Newte, 188 Neb. 412, 197 N.W.2d 403 (1972); Basye v. State,
45 Neb. 261, 63 N.W. 811 (1895).
WITNESSES
The practical application of the Rule allowing specific in-
stances of conduct to be inquired into has the potential for unfair
prejudice since the mere asking of the question concerning misdo-
ings carries with it the suggestion that it is true. The trial judge
should not be hesitant to invoke the provisions of Rule 403 to pre-
vent unfair prejudice. Other recommended procedures for coping
with the problem are outlined in Michelson v. United States.14
Rule 609
IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF CRIME
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibil-
ity of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime
is admissible but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which
he was convicted or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement
regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time Limit Evidence of a conviction under this rule is
not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since
the date of his most recent conviction or of the release of the wit-
ness from confinement, whichever is the later date.
(c) Effect of Pardon or Annulment. Evidence of a conviction
is not admissible under this rule if the conviction has been the
subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure
which was based on innocence.
(d) Juvenile Adjudications. ,Evidence of juvenile adjudications
is not admissible under this rule.
(e) Pendency of Appeal. Pendency of an appeal renders evi-
dence of a conviction inadmissible.
This Rule would change existing Nebraska law.15
(a) General Rule. This subdivision provides that evidence of
a conviction of a felony or a crime involving dishonesty or false
statement, even though a misdemeanor, would be admissible for
impeachment purposes.
(b) Time Limit. Under this subdivision, a time limit of ten
years "since the date of his most recent conviction or of the re-
lease of the witness from confinement, whichever is the later date"
is placed upon this type of evidence. The qualification "since the
date of his most recent conviction" was added to the final draft
of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence (hereinafter "Federal
Rule[s]" or "federal proposal") at the suggestion of the Depart-
ment of Justice. This qualification would allow evidence of a crim-
14. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
15. NEE. REv. STAT. §§ 25-1214, 29-2011 (Reissue 1964). But as to (d),
defendant was held entitled to show juvenile probation of a govern-
ment witness. Davis v. Alaska, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (1974).
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inal conviction 20 or 30 years before trial if the witness has been
convicted of a crime, felony or misdemeanor involving dishonesty,
within ten years prior to trial. Although the federal drafters in-
tended a more restrictive rule governing the admissibility of the
evidence covered by this Rule, they ended up with a pro-prosecu-
tion broadened Rule.
Under H.R. 5463 passed by the United States House of Repre-
sentatives on February 6, 1974, evidence of a criminal conviction
for the purpose of attacking credibility would be admissible only
if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement.1 The House
also placed a ten-year limitation on such evidence without the
qualification contained in the Rule. The House action would ap-
pear to represent the more enlightened view on the subject and
is consistent with Rule 21 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence and
Rule 106 of the Model Code of Evidence. A conviction for motor
vehicle homicide, for example, has little, if any, bearing on credi-
bility and by limiting the evidence to crimes involving dishonesty
or false statement, the true purpose of the impeaching process
is fulfilled.
(e) Pendency of Appeal. This subdivision provides that the
pendency of an appeal renders evidence of a conviction inadmissi-
ble. This is the reverse of the federal proposal. Perhaps there
is a greater presumption of correctness attendant to trials and jury
verdicts in federal courts than in Nebraska courts.
Rule 610
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OR OPINIONS
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of
religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by rea-
son of their nature his credibility is impaired or enhanced.
This Rule is consistent with the law in this country that reli-
gious beliefs or opinions are irrelevant on the issues of credibility
or incompetency.
Rule 611
MODE AND ORDER OF INTERROGATION
AND PRESENTATION
(a) Control by Judge. The judge shall exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and
presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid
16. 120 CONG. REc. H550, H570 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
WITNESSES
needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from har-
assment or undue embarrassment.
(b) Scope of Cross-Examination. A witness may be cross-ex-
amined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including
credibility. In the interests of justice, the judge may limit cross-
examination with respect to matters not testified to on direct ex-
amination.
(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be used
on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary
to develop his testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should be
permitted on cross-examination. In civil cases, a party is entitled
to call an adverse party or witness identified with him and inter-
rogate by leading questions.
(a) Control by Judge. The responsibility for conducting a
proper trial rests with the trial judge and this subdivision of the
Rule merely provides the judge discretionary tools with which to
meet his responsibility.
(b) Scope of Cross-Examination. This subdivision of the Rule
changes Nebraska law17 and adopts the "wide open" or English
rule with respect to cross-examination subject to discretionary con-
trol by the judge.
It has been argued that the existing Nebraska rule ensures that
the customary order for the production of evidence is preserved
by preventing the cross-examiner from grabbing the ball, so to
speak, and running away with it. The order of presenting evidence
is important to counsel and the jury; the trial judge will have to
be alert to exercise his discretion if the Rule is disruptive of the
orderly presentation of evidence.
On the other side of the coin, the Rule will prevent delay in
recalling witnesses and will eliminate many quibbling objections.
(c) Leading Questions. This subdivision appears to be consistent
with Nebraska law and should not present any serious problems
for counsel or the trial jduge.
Rule 612
WRITING USED TO REFRESH MEMORY
If a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the pur-
pose of testifying, either before or while testifying, an adverse
party is entitled to have it produced at the hearing, to inspect it,
to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence
those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness. If
17. Clark v. Smith, 181 Neb. 461, 149 N.W.2d 425 (1967); Griffith v. State,
157 Neb. 448, 59 N.W.2d 701 (1953).
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it is claimed that the writing contains matters not related to the
subject matter of the testimony, the judge shall examine the writ-
ing in camera, excise any portions not so related, and order deliv-
ery of the remainder to the party entitled thereto. Any portion
withheld over objections shall be preserved and made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. If a writing is
not produced or delivered pursuant to order under this rule, thejudge shall make any order justice requires.
This Rule would appear to change existing Nebraska law.18 Un-
der present trial procedure, if a witness refers to a document on
the witness stand to refresh his memory, an adverse party may
inspect the document and cross-examine concerning its contents.
Under this Rule, if a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory
for the purpose of testifying "either before or while testifying,"
the adverse party is entitled to have it produced at the hearing,
to cross-examine the witness thereon and to introduce in evidence
those portions which relate to the witness' testimony. This Rule
applies to all witnesses in civil and criminal trials and to all writ-
ings used to refresh the memory of the witness for the purpose
of testifying.
It has been argued that this Rule's application will lead to pro-
tracted cross-examination, fishing expeditions and numerous trial
delays while documents are located and brought to court. This
may be true, but is there any reason why we should have one
rule for a witness who refers to a writing on the witness stand
to refresh his memory and a -different rule for a witness who re-
fers to a writing on the courthouse steps for the same purpose?
One thing is certain; lawyers will be coming to court with
larger briefcases.
Rule 613
PRIOR STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES
(a) Examining Witness Concerning Prior Statement. In ex-
amining a witness concerning a prior statement made by him,
whether written or not, the statement need not be shown or its
contents disclosed to him at that time, but on request the same
shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.
(b) Extrinsic Evidence of Prior Inconsistent Statement of Wit-
ness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a
witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an oppor-
tunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is af-
forded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests
18. Echert v. United States, 188 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1951); State v. Adams,
181 Neb. 75, 147 N.W.2d 144 (1966).
WITNESSES
of justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to ad-
missions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801 (d) (2).
Subdivision (a) of this Rule refers to the examination of the
witness concerning a prior statement, while subdivision (b) refers
to the admissibility into evidence of a prior inconsistent statement
of the witness.
(a) Examining Witness Concerning Prior Statement. This sub-
division repudiates the Rule of The Queen's Case'9 which found
some favor in this country even after it was repudiated in England
by legislation.
There are times when counsel would like to test the credibility
of the witness by asking him generally about a prior statement,
consistent or inconsistent, without actually confronting him with
the precise statement. This would be permitted under the Rule.
Unwarranted insinuations by counsel are protected aganst by the
Rule and are precluded by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Subdivision (b) of this Rule covers proof by extrinsic evidence
of a prior inconsistent statement and appears to be in accord with
existing Nebraska law.20  It should be noted that special statutes
relating to depositions21 and the production of documents22 affect
the operation of the Rule. Of course, admissions by an adverse
party are not affected by the Rule.
Rule 614
CALLING AND INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES
BY JUDGE
(a) Calling by Judge. The judge may, on his own motion
or at the suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are
entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called.
(b) Interrogation by Judge. The judge may interrogate wit-
nesses, whether called by himself or by a party.
(c) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by thejudge or to interrogation by him may be made at the time or at
the next available opportunity when the jury is not present.
This Rule appears to be consistent with Nebraska law.23  The
need for a judge to call a witness is diminished by Rule 607 allowing
a party to impeach a witness which he has called. Judges should
19. 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (H.L. 1820).
20. Bartek v. Glasers Provisions Co., 160 Neb. 794, 71 N.W.2d 466 (1955).
21. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1267.07 (Reissue 1964).
22. NEB. R-y. STAT. § 25-1222 (Reissue 1964).
23. Coyle v. Stopak, 165 Neb. 594, 86 N.W.2d 758 (1957).
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be reluctant to interrogate witnesses and should do so only to de-
velop the truth and prevent misconception.
Rule 615
EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES
At the request of a party the judge shall order witnesses ex-
cluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses,
and he may make the order of his own motion. This rule does
not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person,
or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural
person designated as its representative by its attorneys, or (3) a
person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the
presentation of his cause.
Under existing Nebraska law, the sequestration of witnesses is
discretionary with the district courts.24 This Rule would provide
for the sequestration of witnesses as a matter or right and, thereby,
make the practice uniform in all districts in the state.
CONCLUSION
The federal proposal is the result of more than a decade of re-
search, study, writings and debate. The Nebraska proposal has
been the subject of study and debate since 1969. Far from being
hurriedly thrust upon the Bench and Bar, the Rules have evolved
with medicine ball swiftness.
While the wisdom of a particular Rule may be subject to a rea-
sonable difference of opinion, it would appear that the Rules,
taken as a whole, represent a concise codification of solid thinking
in the law of evidence.
24. State v. Goff, 174 Neb. 548, 118 N.W.2d 625 (1962).
